SPECTOR FINAL ARTICLE

12/28/2009 10:49 AM

Value Pluralism and the
Two Concepts of Rights

HORACIO SPECTOR∗

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 819
THE WILL THEORY AND THE INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS ................................ 824
VALUE INCOMMENSURABILITY AND DISCOURSE INCOMMENSURABILITY:
THE CASE OF RIGHTS ......................................................................................... 829
THE MINIMAL MEANING OF RIGHTS ................................................................... 837

I. INTRODUCTION
Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct
analysis of rights, both moral and legal. The “Will Theory” and the
“Interest Theory”—the two main views—can each account for various
features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory. The
controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable.1
I will contend in this paper that the discussion of “value pluralism” in
the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept of
rights.

∗ I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Dick Arneson, Daniel Weinstock, and
especially my commentator, Professor Christopher Wonnell, for their helpful comments
during the Conference on Isaiah Berlin, Value Pluralism, and the Law held at the
University of San Diego School of Law on February 20–21, 2009. I have also benefited
from comments made by Marcelo Ferrante, Jeff McMahan, Guido Pincione, Dave
Schmidtz, and Fernando Tesón.
1. For a state of the question, see MATTHEW H. KRAMER ET AL., A DEBATE OVER
RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 1–2 (1998).
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Value pluralism says that there is a plurality of conflicting and
incommensurable universal values.2 Values are said to be incommensurable
“when they raise radically distinct considerations such that there seems,
prima facie, to be no reason to rank one ahead of another in all or most
cases.”3 This is the conception of incommensurability that Isaiah Berlin
embraced. Because it does not include a time variable, I call it
“synchronic value pluralism.” It centrally claims that there is no general
procedure to rank abstract values in such a way so as to allow the
resolution of practical conflicts in particular cases. There is a second
conception of value pluralism that I call “diachronic value pluralism.”
This conception maintains the theses of rivalry and incommensurability
of values but incorporates time as a relevant variable. It claims that at
any given time (t) in the course of human history there is a plurality of
conflicting and incommensurable universal values whose existence
started at some time earlier than t (t–1), and that it is possible for the
plurality of values existing at t to be a proper subset of a plurality of
values that will exist at some time later than t (t+1). This conception is
committed to the view that new values emerge over time according to
various cultural, political, and economic transformations. This does not
mean that values are subjective or relative to a given culture. Rather,
values emerge at a certain time, but their existence is objective and
universal.
The diachronic conception of value pluralism draws on Joseph Raz’s
theory of values. Raz stresses the dependence of values on sustaining
social practices.4 In fact, Raz argues that although the existence of
values has social preconditions, as long as the preconditions are met and
the corresponding values come into being, their existence persists
without restrictions.5 Raz explains the asymmetry of emergence and
continued existence in this way:
The usual pattern is for the emergence, out of previous social forms, of a new
set of practices, bringing into life a new form: monogamous marriage between
partners chosen by each other, the opera, and so on, with their attendant
excellences. Once they come into being, they remain in existence even if the
sustaining practices die out.6

Now, Raz does not say that his “social dependence” thesis implies value
pluralism. Rather, he says that the thesis that values depend on social
practices can accommodate value pluralism because it implies that value

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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judgments depend on genres or kinds that evolve culturally, for example,
opera, sports, and democratic politics, and different genre-bound
evaluations need not be logically contradictory.7 Therefore, Raz’s social
dependence thesis is not the same as diachronic value pluralism, but
there is a resemblance between the two positions.
Political and legal culture has been diversified by the cumulative
accretion of values that express human beings’ concerns in reaction to
different historical predicaments. New value paradigms coexist with
older value paradigms because the latter are central to forms of life that
continue to define people’s senses of identity and meaningfulness. By
the same token, values are incommensurable with one another because
each value presupposes a distinct form of life that cannot be ranked
along an ordering of forms of life.8 That is, values are incommensurable
with each other due to the incommensurability of their supporting forms
of life. An outsider can interpret the value paradigm of an alien society
even if he does not share the relevant form of life, provided he adopts a
participant’s point of view. In adopting the internal perspective, the
outsider translates the beliefs and concerns of the foreign society into his
own forms of life and value paradigms. Other things being equal, the
greater the distance between the outsider’s paradigms and those of the
society he wants to understand, the higher the risk that the translation
will only be an approximate one.9
I will argue that the diachronic conception of value pluralism explains
why conceptual fragmentation in normative language is a natural and
pervasive phenomenon. Indeed, the meaning of normative terms embedded
in successive incommensurable value paradigms often varies so radically
that the concepts denoted by those terms disintegrate into different
concepts. Specifically, I will claim that a radical change of value
paradigm has fragmented the concept of rights, and that value
incommensurability stands in the way of the concept’s coalescing back.
The thesis of conceptual fragmentation of normative language explains
in turn why the perennial debate on the analysis of rights has not yet
been brought to a close. In fact, rival and incommensurable value

7. Id. at 44–45.
8. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 157–58 (1985).
Bernard Williams also says that different cultures or forms of life may be incommensurable
with each other, but he does not mention values or value pluralism. Id.
9. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55 (1961).
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paradigms lie behind the Will Theory and the Interest Theory.10
Because legal systems reflect a diachronic plurality of rival and
incommensurable values, the term right is subject to radical semantic
variation. Therefore, any analysis of the concept of rights that goes
beyond their mere correlativity to duties or their relation to state
enforcement will likely fail to explain existing linguistic practices.
The idea to be explored in this paper is kindred to two preceding
views, one in the philosophy of science and the other in moral
philosophy. The first is Paul Feyerabend’s thesis on the radical variance
of the meaning of terms embedded in successive scientific theories.11
Feyerabend claims that the primitive terms of a theory (T’) often cannot
be defined by reference to the primitive descriptive terms of a different
theory (T), nor correlated to them via correct empirical generalizations.12
For instance, “impetus” in Aristotle’s theory of motion cannot be
defined within the vocabulary of Newton’s mechanics. In fact, within
Aristotelian mechanics, “[t]he impetus of a body in empty space which
is not under the influence of any outer force remains constant.”13 Under
Newton’s mechanics, this proposition is empirically adequate, but there
is no entity that acts as the cause of motion. Momentum, the most
obvious candidate, is rather the result of motion. Even if we formed the
concept of such a force, Newton’s second law would imply a zero value
for such a force in the case of inertial motion.14
The second view is Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis on conceptual
fragmentation in normative discourses. MacIntyre argues that the
10. I develop here an idea originally proposed in Horacio Spector, Is the Will
Theory of Rights Superseded by the Hybrid Theory?, in 2 SOCIAL, POLITICAL, & LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY: LAW: METAPHYSICS, MEANING, AND OBJECTIVITY 289, 294 (Enrique
Villanueva ed., 2007). Chris Wellman and Siegfried Van Duffel also claim that the
dispute over the concept of rights relies on competing values and rival paradigms:
Christopher Heath Wellman, Feinberg’s Two Concepts of Rights, 11 LEGAL THEORY 213
(2005); Siegfried Van Duffel, The Nature of Rights (July 9, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157282. However, Wellman’s and
Van Duffel’s arguments are very different from the one developed here. For instance,
neither Wellman nor Van Duffel discusses the relationship between value pluralism and
the two concepts of rights.
11. P AUL K. F EYERABEND , Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism, in
1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: REALISM, RATIONALISM, AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 44 (1981).
See also Paul K. Feyerabend, On the “Meaning” of Scientific Terms, 62 J. PHIL. 266 (1965).
This thesis overlaps with Kuhn’s famous thesis on the incommensurability of scientific
theories, although Kuhnean incommensurability far exceeds the strictly semantic conception
that I focus on in the text. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ROAD SINCE STRUCTURE 33–57
(James Conant & John Haugeland eds., 2000).
12. FEYERABEND, supra note 11, at 74–91.
13. Id. at 64.
14. Id. at 57–61. Newton’s second law of motion says that “[t]he acceleration of a
body of mass m is related to the force acting on it by F = ma.” N.M.J. WOODHOUSE,
SPECIAL RELATIVITY 5 (2003).
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Enlightenment project of trying to find a rational basis for moral beliefs
is foredoomed to failure because it relies on an ineradicably discrepant
set of moral beliefs and a deeply different vision of human nature.15
MacIntyre says that the modern philosophers “inherited incoherent
fragments of a once coherent scheme of thought and action and, since
they did not recognize their own peculiar historical and cultural
situation, they could not recognize the impossible and quixotic character
of their self-appointed task.”16 For instance, he shows that the meaning
of ought was fixed in the classical Aristotelian framework in a way that
Enlightenment radically changed.17 Within the former framework says
MacIntyre:
To say what someone ought to do is at one and the same time to say what
course of action will in these circumstances as a matter of fact lead toward a
man’s true end and to say what the law, ordained by God and comprehended by
reason, enjoins. Moral sentences are thus used within this framework to make
claims which are true or false.18

My plan is as follows. In Part II, I will indicate how the Will Theory
and the Interest Theory each capture distinct features of the usage of
right in contemporary moral and legal discourse. However, I will also
argue that neither of the two theories is successful in explaining all the
properties of rights. In Part III, I will argue that the debate between the
two theories is irresolvable because the Will Theory and the Interest
Theory reflect the meaning of rights within rival and incommensurable
value paradigms existing in today’s moral and legal culture. The
incommensurability of the underlying value paradigms leads to radical
variance in the meaning of the term rights, despite the obvious
homonymy. Specifically, I will argue that the Will Theory represents a
fragment of a once integrated normative framework, and that it is in
abstraction from such framework that this theory becomes beset by
puzzles. In turn, the Interest Theory is incompatible with the properties
attributed to rights in the older value paradigm. All in all, radical
meaning variance makes a neutral external analysis of rights impossible.
Therefore, there is no reason to try to choose between two theories that
mistakenly assume meaning invariance of normative terms across rival
15. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 51–61 (2d
ed. 1984).
16. Id. at 55.
17. Id. at 53.
18. Id.
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and incommensurable value paradigms.
Finally, in Part IV, I will claim that the term right nonetheless has an
invariant conceptual core across the two main value paradigms in which
it is embedded. Basically, rights entail state enforceability. This
minimal semantic overlap among various usages of rights explains the
confusing coexistence of various value paradigms and their associated
normative terms.
II. THE WILL THEORY AND THE INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS
The Will Theory was introduced in Anglo-American legal theory by
H.L.A. Hart under the name of “Choice Theory,” but it was classically
defended by a number of German jurists in the nineteenth century, and
its roots go back to Kant.19 Hart endorses the Will Theory because it can
explain why rights reflect a distinctive concern for the individual. Under
this view, a right expresses the idea of “one individual being given by
the law exclusive control, more or less extensive, over another person’s
duty so that in the area of conduct covered by that duty the individual
who has the right is a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is
owed.”20 Hart goes on to say that a right holder has at his disposal the
“fullest measure of control” when he possesses: the power to waive or
extinguish the duty, the power to enforce it by legal actions after actual
or threatened breach of the duty, and the power to waive or extinguish
the obligation to pay compensation for violation of the duty.21 So, for
the Will Theory, Hohfeldian powers are central to rights.22
In its early formulation as the “Benefit Theory,” the Interest Theory
was first suggested by Bentham.23 Under this view, A’s having a right to
X against B means that A is the beneficiary of B’s duty to do X. The
German legal scholar Rudolf von Jhering proposed a clearly
recognizable form of the Interest Theory when he changed his
jurisprudential position from legal formalism to legal instrumentalism.24
Von Jhering famously defined a legal right as a “legally protected
19. N.E. Simmonds, Rights at the Cutting Edge, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES supra note 1, at 113, 135, 179.
20. H.L.A. HART, Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162, 183 (1982).
21. Id. at 183–84 (footnote omitted).
22. For Hohfeld, a normative power is a situation in which person A can claim or
waive another person B’s duty. More generally, a normative power is a situation in
which a person can modify the normative position of another by his will.
23. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 223–26
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789); JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 57 (H.L.A.
Hart ed., 1970).
24. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 86 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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interest.”25 In its most plausible version, proposed by Joseph Raz, the
Interest Theory holds that A’s having a right to X against B means that an
interest of A’s, or an aspect of his well-being, is a sufficient reason for
holding B under a duty.26
Both the Will Theory and the Interest Theory provide partial
explanations of some essential features of rights in contemporary
normative discourse, but none of them can explain the whole set of
essential features. Such features are that some rights are alienable but
others are necessarily inalienable; paternalistic interferences with the
right holder—within the range of his rights—are impermissible; all
rights, regardless of their grounding value, outweigh or trump other
normative considerations grounded in subjective interests; and some
rights are more important than others.
If rights are understood as normative positions that satisfy all of these
features, there are no rights according to the Will Theory and the Interest
Theory. A noninstantiated concept of rights is not helpful because one
essential condition of any analysis of rights is that there are some rights,
for example, the right to liberty or privacy. Although both theories fail,
the reason for each theory’s failure is different. The Will Theory fails
because it gives us only a fragment of a once unified and coherent value
framework. The Interest Theory fails because it subordinates rights to
the contingencies of varying subjective interests. This malleable notion
does not fit at all within a previous value paradigm that still governs our
linguistic practices.
Let us discuss these failures in turn.27 First, the Will Theory cannot
account for inalienable rights, that is, for rights that the right holder
cannot waive or relinquish. The problem is that inalienable rights are
considered fundamental in modern liberal culture. It seems paradoxical
that the most fundamental rights, like the rights to life or liberty, are
25. RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN
STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 339 (Leipzig, Breitkopf & Härtel 1865) (author’s translation).
26. JOSEPH RAZ, The Nature of Rights, in THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165, 166
(1986). The Interest Theory has also been defended by NEIL MACCORMICK, Children’s
Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154, 163 (1982), and D.N. MacCormick,
Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A.
HART 189, 192 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977).
27. There are other failures that I will not discuss in this paper. For instance, the
Interest Theory fails to explain why there are rights that are not in the right holder’s
interest, such as the right to an inherited troublesome property. See George W. Rainbolt,
Rights Theory, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 11, 14 (2006).
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precisely those rights for which the crucial element identified by the
Will Theory, namely, the control over the correlative duty, is
substantially absent.28 According to the Will Theory, inalienable rights
cannot be full-fledged rights.
A related problem is that the Will Theory is incapable of accounting
for rights in criminal law contexts. Hart says that in the criminal law
rights have the lesser measure of control.29 But this is not a serious
problem. In effect, right holders do have a considerable measure of
control under the criminal law, too, because they can usually waive the
private law obligations whose breach is a prerequisite to considering
certain conduct as a criminal offense. For instance, if Amy waives her
ownership right over her piano and no one else claims it, Matt’s taking
control of the piano cannot count as theft. Clearly, the right holder lacks
this type of control with respect to murder, for example. In many cases
of this kind, powers are wanting because the relevant right is an
inalienable one, so the preceding difficulty applies. What the right
holder cannot typically do under the criminal law is to cancel the
offender’s criminal liability because prosecution is in most cases a
public matter. This would create a problem for the Will Theory if it
were plausible to hold that victims have a right to determine the
punishment of perpetrators. The Interest Theory cannot explain
inalienability either. Indeed, if rights are grounded on subjective
interests, why could a right holder not relinquish his right if he were to
pursue his interests more effectively in this way? According to the
Interest Theory, alienation or nonalienation are matters to be assessed on
the basis of the promotion of subjective interests, and therefore, on a
case-by-case basis, rather than as a matter of principle.
Second, the Interest Theory cannot explain why moral rights generally
block interferences intended to advance more successfully the rights
holder’s interests.30 According to the nonconsequentialist view of moral
rights, if A has a moral right to X, this right is valid whatever the
consequences of its fulfillment or infringement. This abstract idea
entails that A’s moral right to X—although not relinquished—holds even
if A does not have a subjective interest in X, and even if A does have an
interest in non-X. The latter clause rules out paternalistic interferences.
Because the only basis for holding B under the duty to respect A’s right
is an interest of A’s, B could justifiably infringe A’s right when doing so

28. MacCormick, supra note 26, at 196.
29. HART, supra note 20, at 184.
30. Eric Mack, In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights, 4 J. ETHICS 71, 84
(2000), reprinted in RIGHTS, EQUALITY, AND LIBERTY 71 (Guido Pincione & Horacio
Spector eds., 2000).
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can advance more effectively A’s interests. For instance, if the right to
reject medical treatment were based on the interests of the patient, it
might be possible to justify the imposition of a blood transfusion on a
Jehovah’s Witness. This difficulty also bears on the Will Theory
because the fact that right holders have powers over correlated duties is
consistent with allowing the government to cancel those powers when
the government can better promote in this way the interests of the right
holder. Because the Will Theory fails to display the grounds of the
relevant powers, it cannot forbid paternalism on a principled basis.
The third problem, noted by Joseph Raz with respect to the Interest
Theory, is that it fails to explain why the stringency of some rights does
not match the importance of the right holder’s interests. Raz writes that,
more often than not, we attach greater importance to a right than to its
alleged underlying interests.31 Because Raz conceives of rights as just
morally protected interests, he must look elsewhere for the explanation
of the differential importance of some rights. So he appeals to the value
of those rights for the common good, particularly for the sustenance of a
liberal culture.32 Similarly, the Will Theory lacks the ability to explain
the relative importance of various rights. Like the Interest Theory, it
must avail itself of further claims to justify why the right to life, for
instance, is more important than the right to play dangerous games, such
as Russian roulette.
The fourth and most fundamental problem for both the Will Theory
and the Interest Theory lies elsewhere. Eric Mack identified this
problem with respect to the Interest Theory. This theory cannot account
for the essential connection between moral rights and individuals’
inviolability.33 Contemporary nonconsequentialist moral philosophers
emphasize this connection in discussing the concept of moral rights.34
Thus, Robert Nozick has famously argued that rights are “side

31. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW
AND POLITICS 30–32 (1994).
32. Id. at 33–34.
33. Eric Mack has argued that the prohibition of trade-offs and the principled rejection
of paternalism are two essential features of rights. See Mack, supra note 30, at 95–96.
34. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240 (1978); 2 F.M. KAMM,
MORALITY, MORTALITY: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUS 259–89 (1996); HORACIO
SPECTOR, AUTONOMY AND RIGHTS 163–78 (1992); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM
OF RIGHTS 123–48 (1990); Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, in THEORIES
OF RIGHTS 91 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1981).
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constraints,” that is, deontic constraints.35 On this view, rights are
correlative to moral prohibitions in the form of: “Do not violate
constraints C.” Thus, rights forbid treating people in certain ways, and
they must be respected no matter the overall benefits that could be
obtained by alternative conduct. That is, in principle, rights may not be
infringed even when this can lead us to greater utility overall, and more
strikingly, even when by infringing them we can minimize the overall
violation of rights.36 Therefore, A’s right is also independent from other
people’s subjective interests, that is, projects, preferences, and decisions.
This also includes cases in which ignoring or violating A’s right is
needed to produce a greater nonmoral or moral good. Banning such
“maximizing” violations reflects the Kantian ideal that autonomous
individuals are inviolable.37 However, nonconsequentialists disagree
about the degree of inviolability to which persons are entitled. Some
consequentialists deny that rights are absolute and say that it is
permissible to infringe a right if infringing it is sufficiently better for
third parties than not infringing it is for the right holder.38
The Interest Theory cannot explain why moral rights are side
constraints because it regards the value of rights as based on the right
holder’s subjective interest. Because this interest can conflict with other
people’s interests, the Interest Theory tends to accept the sacrifice of
rights for the sake of overall interest maximization. Mack’s argument is
really more complex. He notes that interests can have either agentneutral or agent-relative value.39 A’s interest has agent-neutral value
when it is valuable to everyone, that is, when A’s interest provides
reasons to every agent, including A. By contrast, A’s interest has agentrelative value when it provides reasons only to A, who is the bearer of
the interest. In the former case, rights fall prey to the utilitarian calculus.
Because the normative force of rights is grounded on the right holder’s
interests, there is always the possibility that those interests will be
outweighed by other people’s interests. Alternatively, if the right
holder’s interests have only agent-relative value, the theory fails to
explain how those interests can justify holding someone else under a
duty.40

35. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974). “Deontic
constraint” is a term of art in moral philosophy that denotes a moral duty or prohibition
that a moral agent ought to respect regardless of the consequences. Not all deontic
constraints are rights because some moral duties need not be correlated to rights.
36. Id. at 29–33. See also SPECTOR, supra note 34, at 163–78.
37. NOZICK, supra note 35, at 35.
38. See THOMSON, supra note 34, at 151.
39. Mack, supra note 30, at 78–79.
40. Id. at 83–84.
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The Will Theory is affected by another version of the same problem.
This theory focuses on the powers of right holders but ignores the
underlying autonomy-based justification. Hart, for example, suggests
that the justification of those powers associated with the Will Theory is
an interest in autonomous choice.41 Under the Kantian view, however,
rights cannot be grounded on interest—not even an interest in
autonomous choice—because that would disregard the value of
autonomy. There is nothing morally special about powers that prevent
us from ignoring them, that is, breaching the controlled duties, if that is
needed to produce greater good or to minimize the violations of rights.
Although the Interest Theory includes an inadequate form of
justification, the Will Theory entirely lacks justification. In either case,
however, the result is much the same: an inability to capture the
anticonsequentialist features of rights in today’s moral language.42
III. VALUE INCOMMENSURABILITY AND DISCOURSE
INCOMMENSURABILITY: THE CASE OF RIGHTS
Moral and legal rights were deep-seated in the value paradigm of
individual autonomy (V1) prevailing from the seventeenth to the
nineteenth centuries. The epitome of this paradigm value is Kant’s
theory of rights. Under his doctrine, legal rights are public and
institutional ways of recognizing the status of persons as autonomous
beings.43 Because rights are based on the status of individuals as
autonomous agents, they are part and parcel of a fundamentally
deontological, nonconsequentialist moral outlook. Legal rights respect
individual autonomy by vesting in individuals the powers that the Will
Theory picks out. It is no surprise that the Will Theory focuses on rights
in property and contract law, which are the cornerstone of Kant’s
conception of law.44 The Will Theory captures only a fragment of the
meaning of rights in the value paradigm of individual autonomy.

41. HART, supra note 20, at 188–89.
42. Gopal Sreenivasan has offered an ingenious “hybrid theory” that tries to avoid
the difficulties. See Gopal Sreenivasan, A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights, 25 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (2005), reprinted in 2 SOCIAL, POLITICAL, & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: LAW:
METAPHYSICS, MEANING, AND OBJECTIVITY, supra note 10, at 263. I have criticized this
theory in Spector, supra note 10.
43. Arthur Ripstein, Kant on Law and Justice, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
KANT’S ETHICS 161 (Thomas E. Hill, Jr. ed., 2009).
44. See Jürgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 772 (1996).
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Therefore, the Will Theory is an incomplete account of a more
substantial value paradigm, that is, the paradigm of individual autonomy,
which once dominated the normative discourse. Within this paradigm,
rights are “trumps” grounded in personal autonomy and capable of
overriding a good deal of consequentialist considerations. If the Will
Theory were restored in such a way so as to mention both powers and to
display their autonomy-based justification, it could easily explain why
moral rights act as deontic constraints. Moreover, it could explain why
some rights are inalienable, that is, because they are indispensable for
preserving man’s autonomous rational nature; why paternalistic
interferences with right holders are generally unacceptable, that is,
because they disregard rational autonomous agency; and why some
rights are more important than others regardless of the strength of their
underlying subjective interests, that is, because those more important
rights are prerequisites for the existence and action of rational human
agency.
The exemplar I use for the value paradigm of individual autonomy is
Kant’s Doctrine of Right, the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals, in
which he examines at length the idea of moral rights as elements of a
theory of justice.45 Kant poses a fascinating question: “But why is the
doctrine of morals usually called (especially by Cicero) a doctrine of
duties and not also a doctrine of rights, even though rights have
reference to duties?”46 He goes on to answer:
The reason is that we know our own freedom (from which all moral laws, and
so all rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral imperative, which
is a proposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting others
under obligation, that is, the concept of a right, can afterwards be explicated.47

Kant thinks that although duties have an epistemic priority over rights,
rights are fundamental in the justification of law as a system of external
sanctions. In Kant’s words, “Right is therefore the sum of the conditions
under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another
in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”48 This principle seems
to be an application of Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” to the specific
problem of distributing the freedom of autonomous beings through a
system of universal coercive norms.49 In a sense, both duties and rights
45. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31–32 (Mary Gregor ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
46. Id. at 31.
47. Id. at 31–32 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 24.
49. The Categorical Imperative is the fundamental unconditioned principle of Kant’s
moral theory. In its first, best known formula, the Categorical Imperative says: “[A]ct only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a
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have a subordinate role in Kant. It is one fundamental duty—enshrined
by the Categorical Imperative—that grounds the whole system of duties
and rights. Practical reason, a necessary aspect of the noumenal self,
imposes this duty on the moral agent and, in so doing, secures his
freedom—both negative freedom from external causation and positive
freedom or self-determination. At that very abstract level, moral duty
and metaphysical freedom come together and indeed constitute two
inextricable sides to the same thing. Hegel expresses this view in a
forceful way: “In duty, the individual liberates himself so as to attain
substantial freedom.”50
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the paradigm of
individual autonomy and its associated picture of rights protecting the
liberty spheres of autonomous and inviolable individuals started to give
way to a different paradigm centered on subjective interests, especially
those appertaining to politically influential groups.51 Rights ceased to be
exclusively regarded as a way of recognizing the status of autonomous
agents and also became normative devices for enhancing the interests of
some groups—unionized workers, consumers, and so on—or for
implementing social goals such as solidarity and welfare. Yet, the old
paradigm did not vanish. Rather, both paradigms started to clash in legal
and moral thought.
The value paradigm of subjective interests (V2) represented a
fundamental change with respect to the value paradigm of individual
autonomy. Instead of viewing law as an institution to demarcate and
protect spheres of nonintervention, the new paradigm regards law as an
instrument for seeking collective goals. We might speculate that the
new paradigm was facilitated by the emergence of an industrial economy
and a concomitant urban society in which a frictionless, physical
demarcation of ownership rights was no longer a recipe for coping with
the violent and intractable conflicts that those new forms of life had
aroused. Because the range of collective goals to be sought under the
new paradigm is vast and varies with the political equilibriums of the
universal law.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (emphasis omitted).
50. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 192 (Allen W. Wood
ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
51. Habermas, supra note 44, at 771–72. See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 18–46 (1991); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1728–30
(1976).
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day, it is congenial with the working of democratic decisionmaking
institutions envisaged as “machines” that produce collective interests
worthy of support and, therefore, various generations of rights that claim
for political recognition and enforcement.
The difference in value paradigms explains the radical semantic
variation of the term right as deployed in the paradigm of individual
autonomy and the paradigm of subjective interests. That is, because the
values shaping each paradigm are rival and incommensurable with each
other, the meaning of rights in V1 (rights1) and that of rights in V2
(rights2) are radically distinct. The point is that rights1 and rights2 are
radically different concepts because they are embedded in rival and
incommensurable value paradigms. Today’s normative language includes
both terms but in ambiguous fashion.
Role/inferential semantics provide the most fruitful framework to
discuss the radical variation of rights in connection with diachronic
value pluralism.52 Under my favored interpretation of the semantics of
moral terms, the meaning of a term (t) is not given by a network of
platitudinous propositions in which t is a node. Rather, t’s meaning is
given by a set of basic rules that govern deductive inferences from or to
propositions that centrally contain t. Accordingly, the meaning of rights
in the paradigm of individual autonomy, that is, rights1, might be given,
for instance, by the following basic inference rules:

52. The literature on role/inferential semantics of moral or legal terms includes:
Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 817–18, 822 (1957); Aleksander Peczenik &
Horacio Spector, A Theory of Moral Ought-Sentences, 73 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 441, 441–42 (1987); Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit, Moral
Functionalism and Moral Motivation, 45 PHIL. Q. 20, 22–24 (1995); Ralph Wedgwood,
Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms, 110 PHIL. REV. 1, 12–13 (2001); Giovanni
Sartor, Legal Concepts: An Inferential Approach 7 (Eur. Univ. Inst., LAW Working
Paper No. 2008/03, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1093627.
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(1) Acceptance of “B’s doing X with respect to A
disrespects A’s autonomous rational agency” commits
one to accepting “A has a right against B that B does not
do X.”
(2) Acceptance of “A has a right against B that B does
not do X ” commits one to accepting “B has a duty to A
not to do X.”
(3) Acceptance of “right R is essential to maintain A’s
autonomous rational agency” commits one to accepting
“A cannot relinquish right R,” that is, R is inalienable.
By contrast, the meaning of rights in the paradigm of subjective
interests, that is, rights2, might be conveyed, for instance, through the
following rules:
(1*) Acceptance of “B’s doing X with respect to A
frustrates a relevant subjective interest of A’s” commits
one to accepting “A has a right against B that B does not
do X.”
(2) Acceptance of “A has a right against B that B does
not do X ” commits one to accepting “B has a duty to A
not to do X.”
(3*) Acceptance of “the subjective interest grounding
right R is more important than the subjective interest
grounding right R” commits one to accepting “other
things being equal, R is more important than R.”
This semantic approach makes it clear why the radical difference in
the values that infuse the paradigm of individual autonomy and the
paradigm of subjective interests change the semantic networks that
provide the meaning of rights in such a way that rights1 and rights2 are
irreducibly distinct. In fact, the set of rules (1), (2), and (3), which
govern the meaning of rights1, and the set of rules (1*), (2), and (3*),
which govern the meaning of rights2, cannot be coalesced into a coherent
set containing the five rules (rule (2) is one and the same in both sets).
In effect, rule (3) cannot be applied to rights2 because, under the
paradigm of subjective interests, it should be left to the right holder to
establish whether relinquishing a right of his furthers more effectively
his subjective interests. In turn, rule (3*) is inapplicable to rights1
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because, under the paradigm of individual autonomy, the importance of
rights cannot be grounded on the strength of the underlying subjective
interests. Additionally, rules (1) and (1*) cannot be blended in an
overarching network of semantic rules because autonomous rational
agency and the satisfaction of subjective interests are different and
incommensurable values.
Indeed, under the paradigm of individual autonomy, the value of
autonomous rational agency is the only possible value, and therefore, its
commensurability with any other value is logically ruled out. If the
values of rational autonomous agency and satisfaction of subjective
interests were commensurable with each other or with a higher order
value, a coalescing network encompassing the networks corresponding
to rights1 and rights2 might emerge. However, given that the underlying
values are rival and incommensurable, the two networks cannot be
consistently reshuffled, except by the expedient of maintaining common
rule (2) and deleting all of the others. This drastic method would render
the concept of rights superfluous once we introduce the concept of
duties. Because no useful reshuffling of the semantic networks is
possible, conceptual fragmentation generates radical meaning variance
under conditions of value incommensurability.
The thesis of the radical variation of the meaning of rights can be also
expressed by appealing to the parallelism with theoretical terms. Just as
theoretical terms deployed in theory (T) may be impossible to translate
into the terminology of a theory (T’), the term rights embodied in value
paradigm V1 cannot be translated into the normative vocabulary of value
paradigm V2 because the semantic networks defining the meaning of
each term cannot be coalesced back into an overlapping network due to
the rivalry and incommensurability of the underlying values.
What is the relation between diachronic value pluralism and the
semantic fragmentation of normative terms? Let us say that a normative
term (t) is embedded in value paradigm (V) when some statements
containing t are true in all possible worlds in which the values embodied
in V exist but are false in some possible worlds in which the values
embodied in V do not exist. For instance, the term right is embedded in
the paradigm of individual autonomy because the statement that “people
have a right to privacy” is true in all possible worlds in which individual
autonomy is valuable but false in some possible worlds in which
individual autonomy is not a value, for example, a world (W) in which
privacy does not contribute to any value existing in W. Now if values
deployed in V1 and V2 are rival and incommensurable, the meaning of t
in V2 may be radically different from the meaning of T in V1. Both
paradigms may have inconsistent normative consequences because they
embody conflicting values. This inconsistency is likely to be reflected in
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the meaning of t. And given that those values are incommensurable with
each other, the normative inconsistency cannot be reconciled by a
procedure that ranks or weighs those values. Rivalry and incommensurability
of value paradigms generate the radical semantic fragmentation of the
normative terms embedded in those paradigms. The term radical means
here that a coalescing back of the fragmented meanings is not possible.
To put it briefly, value-laden normative terms are radically different in
meaning if the values with which they are laden are both rival and
incommensurable to one another.
Because the thesis about the radical semantic variance of value-laden
normative terms bears resemblance to the thesis of the radical meaning
variation of theory-laden scientific terms, it is useful to note that there
are three main differences between the semantic variation of scientific
terms and that of normative terms such as right.
First, although theoretical terms cannot be defined in a theoretically
neutral language because they are theory-laden, some normative terms
cannot be defined in a value-neutral language because they are valueladen, and the values with which they are laden are, in turn,
incommensurable with each other. This means that although meaning
variance of theoretical terms explains the incommensurability of
scientific theories, meaning variance of normative terms depends on
value incommensurability. The notion of dependence relevant here is a
negative one. If the value paradigms in which normative terms are
embedded were commensurable with one another, the fragmented
semantic networks could coalesce back into a consistent network, and
radical meaning variance would not exist. However, this process is not
possible because rival and incommensurable value paradigms have
irreconcilably inconsistent normative consequences.
Second, although there is widespread consensus that scientific terms
have a fundamental referential or extensional dimension, many
metaethical positions assign, if at all, only a limited importance to the
referential function of normative terms.53 Empirical terms in scientific
53. Metaethics is the philosophical study of moral language and thinking; it is
typically conducted in a second order language or metalanguage. Noncognitivist
metaethical theories emphasize the expressive function of moral utterances, instead of
their denotation or reference—also called extension. See SIMON BLACKBURN, ESSAYS IN
QUASI-REALISM 54 (1993); SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS 49–50 (1998);
STEPHEN DARWALL, THE BRITISH MORALISTS AND THE INTERNAL ‘OUGHT’: 1640–1740, at
9–10 (1995); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS 7–8 (1990); R.M. HARE,
FREEDOM AND REASON 189–91 (1963); R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 207–08 (1981);
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theories refer to the natural world, and therefore, co-reference of
empirical terms used by older and newer theories may allow theory
comparability. Meaning invariance secured by co-reference may be all
we need to compare two theories and choose one as closer to the truth.
However, this does not apply to theoretical terms, such as mass, that lack
direct reference to empirical phenomena. In the absence of co-reference,
the meaning of theoretical terms is established by clusters of interrelated
terms. Theoretical terms can be likened to normative terms because
none of them can be solely defined in an extensional way. Because no
referential analysis can exhaust the meaning of a normative term such as
rights, the semantic variation of this term implies that both “rightsdiscourses” are untranslatable to each other. Therefore, showing that
meaning variance is compatible with invariance of reference is of no
consequence for the discussion of the semantic incommensurability of
rights.
Finally, unlike successive scientific theories that entirely replace older
ones, value paradigms typically evolve by accretion, which means that at
any given time we do not encounter pure paradigms but rather mixed
value paradigms that maintain older ones—though often within more
restricted scopes. Thus, in contemporary legal cultures, the individual
autonomy paradigm and the paradigm of collective interests coexist in
Berlinian fashion, giving rise to tensions and conflicts that cannot be
solved by reference to one neutral, all-encompassing value. Older
individualist values still are there because even though most of us are not
farmers and ranchers in modern industrial democracies, we stick to the
view of ourselves as autonomous beings, though perhaps uncomfortably
so within crowded cities and factories.
Although the Will Theory fragmentarily captures the classical features
of rights, especially those associated with rights in deontological moral
thinking, the Interest Theory seeks to accommodate the widely different
kinds of rights that modern legal systems recognize and their various
justifications in subjective interests. Given the rivalry and incommensurability
of the values underlying both theories and the semantic variation of
rights embedded in each theory, it is impossible to provide a rational
single unified analysis of rights that does justice to the diverse and
changing values that have shaped its various meanings.

R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 180 (1952); HORACIO SPECTOR, ANALYTISCHE
UND POSTANALYTISCHE ETHIK (1993); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE
34–35 (1944).
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IV. THE MINIMAL MEANING OF RIGHTS
The meaning of moral terms does not remain invariant across distinct
value paradigms, even if the same names are maintained. Now, because
new value paradigms often retain the old normative vocabulary, the
problem of the semantic variation of normative terms is seldom
addressed, even by theorists who endorse value incommensurability.54
Radicals who adopt a revisionist stance and try to eliminate some old
normative terms can always be encountered. For example, Jeremy
Bentham, a well-known defender of the paradigm of collective interests,
rejected natural rights with the famous dictum: “Natural rights are
nonsense upon stilts.”55 But the language of rights has survived this
radical assault and has been transferred from the classical paradigm to
the new paradigm.
The paradigm of subjective interests did not replace the old term, but
radical conceptual change did occur, despite the fact that rights1 and
rights2 share rule (2), that is, that correlativity to duties is a common
feature of both concepts of rights. This fact alone could not explain why
the term rights is maintained as distinct from duties. Although rights1
and rights2 have radically different meanings because they are embedded
in conflicting and incommensurable value paradigms, both terms share a
minimal meaning. This semantic core can be couched in the following
inferential rule:
(4) Acceptance of “A has a right against B that B does
not do X” commits one to accepting that “state coercion
can permissibly be used, or must be used, to secure
fulfillment of B’s duty to A not to do X.”
Curiously, neither the Will Theory nor the Interest Theory emphasizes
the minimal meaning conveyed by inferential rule (4). Yet Kant was
mindful of this feature of rights. In locating rights in the Doctrine of
Right, he implicitly assumed that the point of moral rights, as opposed to
moral duties, is to establish the conditions for the use of permissible

54. For instance, Joseph Raz offers a unified analysis of rights in RAZ, supra note
26, at 165–66. The great exception is Alasdair MacIntyre. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
55. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in ‘NONSENSE UPON STILTS’: BENTHAM,
BURKE, AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46, 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987).
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coercion in society.56 In this respect, as in many others, Hart follows
Kant. Hart also claims that rights justify the use of public force.57
The semantic variation of the term right must be accordingly
qualified. Although the term cannot be defined across incommensurable
value paradigms, it has a common core that seems to be paradigm
invariant. Right is conceptually tied to state or public enforceability.
This is a minimal content, though. A theorist of rights would probably
not be content with just claiming that rights are “events of any kind that
may or must be secured by state coercion.” But it was perhaps this
minimal content of rights that made the term’s maintenance useful. The
important point is that the thesis of semantic variation does not stand in
the way of the minimalist view, that is, the view that rights has an
invariant core meaning across various normative vocabularies associated
with incommensurable value paradigms. This meaning is reflected in
the basic fact that rights discourse performs a political function,
whichever values that discourse seeks to respect or promote. Although
this view falls short of revealing the value assumptions that have shaped
the semantics of rights, the paradox is that any analysis of rights that
goes beyond the minimalist view will ultimately flounder in the waters
of diachronic value pluralism and its resultant fragmentation of meaning.

56.
57.
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KANT, supra note 45, at 31–32.
H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175–91 (1955).

